I Introduction
The United States lacked an operational central bank for the first few months. As a noncombatant at this time, the U.S. had yet to face the massive financial demands of waging war.
By April 2, 1917, when the U.S. entered the military conflict, the nascent Federal Reserve was system was still far from a full-formed and functioning institution. The wartime demands made the Fed temporarily subservient to the needs of the Treasury and thereby stunted the development of its institutional capacity, narrowed the formulation of policy, and limited the exploration of crises response strategies of the central bank.
The banking crises of the National Banking Era , often considered events that the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, were alleviated by the combined efforts of private clearing houses (mainly, the New York Clearing House Association), the United States Treasury, and occasional assistance from abroad. 1 Given this conventional viewpoint, it is curious that the Federal Reserve Act displays scant reference to these crises in the text of the legislation, and leaves an ambiguous role for the Federal Reserve System in crisis alleviation.
We explore why lessons of financial crisis prevention from the pre-Federal Reserve National
Banking Era were not incorporated into the institutional understanding of the Federal Reserve System. Curiously, the concepts that guided the policies that successfully avoided a panic in resources to support the war effort. This unexpected role, along with the conceited notion that panics would be "mathematically impossible" (Studenski and Krooss 1952: 258) , likely contributed to the lack of institutional focus on crises prevention strategies in the subsequent decade.
The paper begins by offering a condensed and narrow discussion of the United States prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, then proceeds to a discussion of the central elements of the Federal Reserve System as conceived before World War I. We then discuss the substantive effects of World War I on the development of the Federal Reserve System, both when the U.S. was noncombatant and after April 1917, when the U.S. entered the war. We discuss the role played by the Fed throughout this period and highlight the difference between that role and the one proposed within the institutional design in the Federal Reserve Act.
II

Background: Founding of the Federal Reserve System and World War I
The flaws of the pre-Fed U.S. monetary system were well-known by market participants, economists and economic policy makers and the design of the Federal Reserve System took direct aim at addressing those flaws. The dual banking system, the pyramid structure of bank reserves, the concentration of reserves in New York City as funding sources for call money loans on stock and bond collateral were all structures targeted by the Federal Reserve Act. Federal
Reserve System activities in the early years, however, were actions in response to a set of challenges completely different from the ones it was designed to address. As a result, it is unsurprising that assessments of Federal Reserve policies during its early years are unflattering. Noyes (1916: 32) offers a synopsis of the key elements of monetary reform legislation needed to address to solve the recurrent crises problem in the U.S. Firstly, there should be a way to centralize the pool of gold reserves. Secondly, there should be a central lending authority from which intermediaries could rediscount assets. Thirdly, Noyes suggests that the issues of national bank notes (as notes of issuing banks) should be replaced by notes issued by a central authority. The Federal Reserve Act satisfies all these elements of reform. Kemmerer (1922: 37) expresses the hopes and aspirations for the system by the reformers:
The time therefore arrived in the summer of 1917 when commercial banks belonging to the Federal Reserve System ceased tying up their legal reserve money by depositing it in the banks of our money market centers there to be loaned out at call to speculators on the stock and produce exchanges. This divorcing of the legal reserves of over 9800 commercial banks from the speculative and capital loans of the stock market -mainly, that of Wall Street -is one of the big achievements of the Federal Reserve System. However, the assessment was premature and ultimately inaccurate. The Federal Reserve
System was unable to weaken the connection between the banks and call money lending.
Further, despite dismantling the pyramid reserve structure, the dual banking system and correspondent banking remained essential for effective operation of the U.S. financial system.
The establishment of the Federal Reserve System was only the first step in monetary reform; it took several years for its operations to become fully functional. Wicker (1966) Friedman and Schwartz (1963: 192) note:
The Federal Reserve System was created by men whose outlook on the goals of central banking was shaped by their experience on money panics during the national banking era. The basic monetary problem seemed to them to be banking crises produced by or resulting in an attempted shift by the public from deposits to currency… The act was no sooner passed than the conditions taken for granted ceased to hold. Before the system began operations, World War I had begun. During the financing of World War I and the period immediately following the war, the Federal Reserve System instead lent funds to banks at "preferential rates" -rates equal to yields on Treasury Certificates-to encourage bank financing of Treasury debt. Essentially, the Fed, by lending on Treasury debt collateral at interest rates below the rates offered on the Treasury debt, was providing banks with a profitable method of financing purchases of Treasury debt. And as a passive provider of credit, the Fed surrendered control over the size of its balance sheet.
Secondly, top level officials at the Federal Reserve -Reserve Bank Governors -took leadership positions as Liberty Bond Committee Chairs to promote their sale. Thirdly, by offering discount loans on Treasury bond and debt collateral at rates below the discount rate on commercial paper collateral, the Fed thereby undermined its own "real bills" foundations -the promotion of productive lending suffered relative to the financing of government debt. Further, the Fed bought some Treasury debt and Fed ownership of government debt was problematic because
Treasury debt could not be used as collateral for its currency -Federal Reserve notes.
Discounted commercial paper and gold were the only acceptable backing for currency.
The restriction on the collateral for currency arose from the "real bills" doctrine, which
proposed that aggregate credit should fluctuate in tandem with the "needs of Wicker contends that the early Fed lacked a coherent idea and an explicit vehicle (an asset to buy) to produce a trend increase in the base money supply to support both the growing economy and the expanding financial sector. The irony is that a discount window interest rate at a penalty interest rate as was intended in the Federal Reserve Act never took hold after the early experience with a preferential rate for Treasury debt. A penalty rate would be consistent with the issuance of clearing house loan certificates, and the concept of discount window lending as a temporary source of liquidity. Further, a penalty rate is analogous to a key component of Bagehot's rule to combat banking crises -lend freely on good collateral at a high rate.
However, by allowing the discount rate to remain below market interest rates, the Fed instituted the discount window as an administered credit vehicle in which applicants for borrowing faced selective acceptance. Selectivity as well as the later (1927-29) institutional use of "direct pressure" -Fed influence on how the borrower was to employ the borrowed funds to limit "speculation" -likely contributed to the perceived aversion to borrowing at the discount window that persisted through the subsequent decades.
III A New Monetary Authority Without a Relevant Antecedent
The changes in the world financial system arising from World War I had serious Chandler 1957: 69) . In that case, it is likely that Strong would have struggled to extend liquidity to non-member banks. As was observed in the 1930s, the Fed eschewed allowing members to borrow from the discount window in support of its non-member correspondent banks. money supply, although these actions were on a smaller scale and dependent upon the Treasury's fiscal balance. Only a Treasury in surplus could inject gold into the financial system. Separately, Timberlake (1984) and Gorton (1985) offer further that the clearing house system of the National Banking Era (1863-1914) provided some imperfect and incomplete elements of monetary policy.
IV Fed Sufficiency and Persistent Flaws
The design of the Federal Reserve System bearing strong resemblance to the clearing house system emphasizes that contemporaries involved in the design of the institution learned lessons from the past. However, the key elements of "policy" during the National Banking Era that preceded the Fed was the issuance of clearing house loan certificates, the suspension of convertibility, and on occasion (when possible) the pooling of cash reserves. In such a view, the crises endemic to the previous era likely seemed less relevant to the Fed in the 1920s than the problems it faced during its tumultuous war-time experience. We also uncovered a notion of "Fed sufficiency" in the documents and communications of Federal Reserve officials that was not necessarily shared by other contemporary commentators.
For a number of informed commentators, the Federal Reserve System was a dramatic improvement upon the clunky emergency currency procedures that was appended upon an awkward currency and monetary system. Had we not seen the subsequent policy mistakes of the (2000) and Bordo and Wheelock (2011) -that the Fed was not established with the intention of responding to financial panics. Wicker (2000) suggests that holding such a premise provides the most coherent explanation for why the Federal Reserve System was so inept at forestalling banking panics. In the same paper, Wicker acknowledges that the traditional arguments can also explain the Federal Reserve's failure to address consistently and effectively liquidity drains arising from banking panics. Editors Welton and Crennan (1922: XV) shed light on the resistance to the central bank from state banks and national banks alike. They describe state banks as "hostile or, at best, only 6 A recent paper by Bordo and Wheelock (2011) emphasizes the lack of proper structural design of the system as the source of the problem, but also notes that there is no text in the Federal Reserve Act that aims the system toward panic prevention. 7 White (1983) Statistics, 1914 Statistics, -1941 neutral to the Federal Reserve System." Implementation of mandatory clearing and collection of checks and drafts to be undertaken by the Federal Reserve System, "threw the country banks that were members of the System into spasms of anger and fear. It made the state bank glad that they were beyond such meddling." Their observations emphasize how the implementation of sweeping monetary reform fell short of intended goals and allowed existing weakness to persist.
Bankers were also aware of the shortcomings of the Federal Reserve System and doubted its ability to transform the financial system. Arthur Reynolds (1922) The old banking practice of the country had its basis in too many years of actual habit and it was but natural that banks generally should be hesitant and cautious in making radical changes in their methods; indeed a great many of them felt that the Federal Reserve Banks, if supported too generously, would ultimately encroach upon and usurp some of the functions of existing banks.
Chicago was the center of the "asset backed" currency movement making Reynold's resistance to the Federal Reserve System unsurprising. In February 1915, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, a New York based publication, shares similar doubts when commenting that, "it will hardly be claimed that the Federal Reserve System is yet so firmly established that it can be depended upon in and by itself to cope with a situation of extreme difficulty."
With contemporary and modern commentators often emphasizing the insufficiency of the Undoubtedly, the issue of this emergency currency under the amended Aldrich-Vreeland Act was of great assistance to our people. From the banking point of view, however, it could hardly be said to inspire much confidence. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act, even as amended, simply gave currency not confidence to the people. Surely under such an Act little confidence could be inspired from the fact that the banks were permitted to increase their liabilities in the form of notes on security much of which was unliquid, and on a reserve of only 5 percent. …. The real problem, however, is the increase of its loaning power by providing means for rediscounting short-term commercial paper, and that is just what the Federal Reserve Act accomplishes. [Page 8 Speech by Governor Charles s. Hamlin, October 25, 1916.] The viability of the Federal Reserve System as a semi-independent government initiated institution was still unsettled. Perhaps the dismissive tone aimed toward emergency currency reflects the concern that Congress would have second thoughts about the creation of the Fed given the success of Aldrich-Vreeland notes. saying that, "it was undoubtedly unfortunate that the reserve system was not in operation at the time of the crisis in [1914] ," (Reed (1922) ).
Silber (2008) Reserve's policy throughout the Great Depression in which only select institutions were permitted access to liquidity and had to post collateral of high quality from a restricted set of qualifying assets in order to borrow at the discount window.
Curiously the lending principles employed in 1914 were implemented in the U.S. during the Financial Crisis of 2008-09. For the rediscovery, we attribute an influential role to financial economic history, namely, the timely works by William Silber -Silber (2007) and his more extensive book Silber (2008) . The book highlights the role of pre-emptive financial policy, specifically Federal Government policies to allow commercial banks to acquire a rapid increase in liquidity (cash), when the New York Stock Exchange was closed down for nearly 4 months.
Silber further highlights key amendments to the Aldrich-Vreeland Act that were passed as the crisis unfolded in order to make the liquidity provision mechanism accessible to the largest banks.
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One of the more important factors linking the 1914 experience to the modern one is the composition of the assets taken as collateral for extensions of liquidity loans. Emergency currency had tighter collateral restrictions than those of clearing house loan certificates.
Similarly, in 2008-09, the various liquidity programs offered by the Federal Reserve System enabled borrowing institutions to liquefy a wider array of assets as collateral for the loans than would have been acceptable through standard discount window mechanisms available during 10 Silber credits an astute Treasury Secretary William McAdoo with the insight to anticipate the need for liquidity and the political acumen to achieve the required legislative outcome.
standard conditions. Further, the Fed expanded the set of institutions toward which it could allocate the liquidity, and the liquidity was available on a national scale.
V Summary and Conclusions
World War I financing, following soon after the Federal Reserve System became operational at near full capacity in 1917, distracted the new institution from learning its purpose.
The watershed event, the First World War, overwhelmed the Fed's process of settling on its legislated purposes, ultimate goals, procedures, and policies. There is no question that the priority of financing the war effort was paramount for the Federal Reserve System; the primacy of that role, however, hindered development of the core elements of the institution as designed. Act.
